学 术 报 告
报告摘要： We study a common scenario in industry where returns to scale are nondecreasing and thus full cooperation via pooling all the resources together among related firms is the most efficient way of production. This scenario is usually modelled as a class of cooperative games, referred to as resource pooling games. We argue that resource pooling games could be better understood via directly analyzing the underlying functions that are referred to as the cooperative functions than via analyzing the reduced cooperative games. By combining the works of Sharkey and Telser (1978) and Aubin (1981), we provide a framework for analyzing cooperative functions. We focus on cooperative functions that are supportable in that nonemptiness of the core is guaranteed for all related resource pooling games, and argue that Aubin core can be adapted to study cooperative functions and has several remarkable advantages over the core. We find that a cooperative function always derives a convex game if and only if it is supermodular and coordinate-wise convex. We provide several applications, including linear production games, EOQ games, and newsvendor games.
报告者简介：曹志刚，北京交通大学经济管理学院，任“卓越百人计划”教授。主要研究兴趣为博弈论及其应用，包括网络博弈和算法博弈论等。在相关领域主流刊物发表论文20余篇，包括Games and Economic Behavior、Social Choice and Welfare 和Theoretical Computer Science等期刊以及Economics & Computation等会议。现任中国运筹学会博弈论分会副秘书长、中国系统工程学会和中国运筹学会青年工作委员会委员。